Choose one question out of the three given. Write your answer in 250-300 words providing arguments and examples.

1. What is common between the English language and other European languages?
2. What role does the development of technology play in teaching languages?
3. How do grammar and semantics interconnect?

ЛЕКСИКО-ГРАММАТИЧЕСКИЙ ТЕСТ

You are going to read an excerpt from an open letter written by Émile Zola to the President of France, Félix Faure, on the Dreyfus affair. For questions 1-10, read the text below and decide which answer (A, B, or C) best fits each gap.

Would you allow me, grateful (1) ___ I am for the kind reception you once extended to me, to show my concern about maintaining your well-deserved prestige and to point out that your star which, until now, has shone so brightly, risks (2) ___ by the most shameful and indelible of stains?

(3) ___ by vile slander, you have won the hearts of all. You are radiant in the patriotic glory of our country’s alliance with Russia, you are about (4) ___ over the solemn triumph of our World Fair, the jewel that crowns this great century of labour, truth, and freedom. But what filth this wretched Dreyfus affair has cast (5) ___ your name - I wanted to say ‘reign’ -. A court martial, under orders, has just dared to acquit a certain Esterhazy, a supreme insult to all truth and justice. And now the image of France is (6) ___ this filth, and history shall record that (7) ___ was under your presidency that this crime against society was committed.

As they have dared, so shall I dare. Dare (8) ___ the truth, as I have pledged to tell it, in full, since the normal channels of justice have failed to do so. My duty is to speak out; I do not wish to be an accomplice in this travesty. My nights would (9) ___ be haunted by the spectre of the innocent man, far away, suffering the most horrible of tortures for a crime he did not commit.

And it is to you, Sir, that I shall proclaim this truth, with all the force (10) ___ of the revulsion of an honest man. Knowing your integrity, I am convinced that you do not know the truth.

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Striking matches on their rope-roughened palms, the burly whalers who chase Moby Dick seem unlikely (1) A for modernity. But in an important, even prophetic way, that is what they are. The crew of the Pequod are a wondrous (2) B "from all the isles of the sea, and all the ends of the earth". Sailors of at least 13 nationalities are “federated along one keel” with Captain Ahab: Chinese and Tahitian, Icelandic and Portuguese. Their creator, Herman Melville—who was born 200 years ago, on August 1st 1819—was the first great writer of the age of globalisation.

The 19th century witnessed an unprecedented international (3) D of people, goods and ideas. Sailors were at the (4) F of this exchange, crossing and re-crossing oceans in a “devious zigzag world-circle”, as Melville put it, constantly (5) G to exotic lands and strange customs. A shortage of manpower and the dangers of the sea meant captains often cared little who shipped with them, provided they were able (6) H. This was a cosmopolitanism of necessity rather than ideology, a (7) I phenomenon largely (8) J by contemporary authors.

But not by Melville. As a Jack-Tar of 19, he sailed the New York-to-Liverpool circuit in 1839, an experience he recalled ten years later in his novel “Redburn”. He saw the awful conditions endured by Irish immigrants below decks and the hostility they (9) K upon arrival in America. “If they can get here,” Melville thought, “they have God’s right to come.” The docking of an Indian vessel in Liverpool was an opportunity to (10) L stories with a Lascar sailor. “It is a God-send to fall in with a fellow like this,” Melville later wrote. “His experiences are like a man from the moon—wholly strange, a new revelation.”
You are going to read an excerpt from an essay on self-reliance written by Ralph Waldo Emerson. Ten sentences have been removed from the text. Read the text and complete the gaps with the sentences from the list. One sentence is extra.

It is for want of self-culture that the superstition of Travelling, whose idols are Italy, England, Egypt, retains its fascination for all educated Americans. They who made England, Italy, or Greece venerable in the imagination did so by sticking fast where they were, like an axis of the earth. (1) __________
The soul is no traveller; the wise man stays at home, and when his necessities, his duties, on any occasion call him from his house, or into foreign lands, he is at home still, and shall make men sensible by the expression of his countenance, that he goes the missionary of wisdom and virtue, and visits cities and men like a sovereign, and not like an interloper or a valet.

(2) __________ He who travels to be amused, or to get somewhat which he does not carry, travels away from himself, and grows old even in youth among old things. In Thebes, in Palmyra, his will and mind have become old and dilapidated as they. (3) ____________

Travelling is a fool's paradise. (4) ____________ At home I dream that at Naples, at Rome, I can be intoxicated with beauty, and lose my sadness. I pack my trunk, embrace my friends, embark on the sea, and at last wake up in Naples, and there beside me is the stern fact, the sad self, unrelenting, identical, that I fled from. I seek the Vatican, and the palaces. I affect to be intoxicated with sights and suggestions, but I am not intoxicated. (5) ____________

But the rage of travelling is a symptom of a deeper unsoundness affecting the whole intellectual action. The intellect is vagabond, and our system of education fosters restlessness. (6) ____________ We imitate; and what is imitation but the travelling of the mind? Our houses are built with foreign taste; our shelves are garnished with foreign ornaments; our opinions, our tastes, our faculties, lean, and follow the Past and the Distant. (7) ____________ It was in his own mind that the artist sought his model. It was an application of his own thought to the thing to be done and the conditions to be observed.

(8) ____________ Your own gift you can present every moment with the cumulative force of a whole life's cultivation; but of the adopted talent of another, you have only an extemporaneous, half possession. (9) ____________ No man yet knows what it is, nor can, till that person has exhibited it. Where is the master who could have taught Shakspeare? Where is the master who could have instructed Franklin, or Washington, or Bacon, or Newton? (10) ____________ The Scipionism of Scipio is precisely that part he could not borrow. Shakspeare will never be made by the study of Shakspeare. Do that which is assigned you, and you cannot hope too much or dare too much.

A Be submissive!
B Every great man is a unique.
C He carries ruins to ruins.
D I have no churlish objection to the circumnavigation of the globe, for the purposes of art, of study, and benevolence, so that the man is first domesticated, or does not go abroad with the hope of finding somewhat greater than he knows.
E In manly hours, we feel that duty is our place.
F Insist on yourself; never imitate.
G My giant goes with me wherever I go.
H Our first journeys discover to us the indifference of places.
I Our minds travel when our bodies are forced to stay at home.
J That which each can do best, none but his Maker can teach him.
K The soul created the arts wherever they have flourished.

ПОНИМАНИЕ ПИСЬМЕННОГО ТЕКСТА

You are going to read an extract from an essay. For questions 1-10, read the text below and choose the answer (A, B, or C) which you think fits best according to the text.

Were a single document to mark the high-point of liberal-world-order hubris, it would surely be "The End of History?", an essay written by Francis Fukuyama, an American academic, in 1989. Mr Fukuyama’s question, posed a couple of months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, was whether the world was seeing the “universalisation of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government”. His answer was yes.

How extraordinary that seems in 2018. China, the world’s most successful economy over the past 30 years and likely to be its largest over the coming 30, is growing less liberal, not more, and its state-led, quasi-capitalist illiberalism is attracting admirers across the emerging world. In the Muslim world, and elsewhere, ties of sect and community, often reinforced by war and the fear of war, bind far tighter than those of liberal aspiration. On a measure of democracy made by the Economist Intelligence Unit, our sister organisation, more than half of the 167 countries surveyed in 2017 were slipping backwards. The backsliders include America, where the president seems to prefer dictators to democrats.

That is particularly worrying. America did more than any other nation to create and sustain the order Mr Fukuyama celebrated. In the 1940s it underwrote the Marshall plan and championed the creation of the IMF, the World Bank, the GATT and NATO. It cheered on the first moves towards European unity. Its armed forces contained liberalism’s greatest enemy, the Soviet Union. Its dollar underpinned the global economy. And because America was founded on liberal values, this Pax Americana espoused liberal values, even if it did not always live up to them.

Mr Fukuyama thought the end of the cold war would let the liberal internationalist project move beyond its reliance on American power. The prosperous examples of America, Europe, East Asia’s tiger economies and a Latin America abandoning military rule, along with a lack of alternatives, would bring the rest of the world on board. So it did, to some extent, for a while. But it was far from universal. And America has become an unhappy Atlas.

President Donald Trump’s rejection of the values underlying NATO and the WTO has been remarkable, his spurning of America’s role in maintaining them even more so. Yet his approach is not without precedent, or support. In 2002, the outrages of September 11th 2001 still fresh in their minds and hearts, only 30% of Americans agreed that “America should deal with its own problems and let other countries deal with theirs”. But long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have reinforced American scepticism about interventions abroad that cannot be pulled off quickly and do not seem
vital to the national interest. By 2016, the idea of America dealing with its own problems and leaving the rest of the world to deal with theirs appealed to 57%. Younger people are astonishingly insouciant about revanchist Russia and ascendant China. Only one in two millennials think it is important for America to maintain its military superiority.

However, liberal ideals are worthless unless backed by military power. It is possible that the next president could swing in the opposite direction, recognising the vital role its alliances play in American security, seeking to reform rather than vilify international institutions like the WTO and reinvigorating international co-operation on climate change—a grave threat to the world order which has been far less doughtily faced than that of communism. But it is unlikely. So is any notion of Europe and other democracies taking on the challenge. And even if either were to come about, China would still represent a daunting challenge. Xi Jinping’s determination to centralise power and to hold on to it indefinitely is a large part of that. But Mr Xi may represent a deeper shift: one made possible by the addition of digital technology to the apparatus of centralised authoritarianism.

Liberals have long believed that state control eventually collapses under its inefficiencies and the damage that the abuse of power does to systems that lend themselves to it. But the enthusiasm with which China has embraced digital living has given the Communist Party new tools for political control and responsive tyranny. Cyber-China may not have solved for all time the challenge of identifying and quashing opposition without stirring up more of it. But its efforts in that direction could last longer than hitherto imagined. It would be a foolish mistake to base an international order on the assumption that China will become more liberal any time soon.

Liberals also used to believe that autocracies might be capable of one-off bursts of innovation, like Sputnik, but could not produce technical progress reliably, year in year out. Yet in the past five years, Chinese tech firms have generated hundreds of billions of dollars of wealth. The protection afforded them by the Great Firewall and government policy is part of that success, but not all of it. China’s government is investing huge resources in tomorrow’s technologies while its new digital giants make full use of the vast amounts of data they have on Chinese needs, habits and desires.

Mr Xi sometimes stresses China’s commitment to peaceful, harmonious development. But he then speaks more ominously about “great-power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics”. On climate change, or indeed trade, China talks warmly of the rules-based global system. Yet it ignores international-court rulings against its militarised island-building in the South China Sea and blocks UN criticism of its abysmal record on human rights.

A reasonable forecast is that China will embrace international collaboration where it sees advantage in doing so and act unilaterally where its interests dictate. It will also devote some of its burgeoning technological capabilities to new ways of making war. If America continues on its current path it will do much the same. This will not make the two equivalent. Though China’s military capabilities will grow quickly, they will not match America’s. And it will always be easier and wiser for liberals to trust America to do the right thing in the end.

But if there is no clear international order, just big powers doing what they want, the world will get more of the same as Brazil, Indonesia, India, Nigeria and others increase in strength. Regional powers rubbing up against each other unconstrained; nuclear weapons; the destabilising effects of climate change: it might all work out for the best. But that is not the way to bet.
1. The essay by Francis Fukuyama is considered by the author as
   A a sign of healthy skepticism.
   B a symbol of the collapse of communism.
   C a symbol of foolish arrogance among liberals.

2. The author points to the evidence of
   A liberalism showing signs of a relapse.
   B a joint effort on the part of different regimes to reach global peace.
   C liberal values uniting people of all races, colours and creeds across the world.

3. The United States is considered
   A to be the driving force behind the failure of the European Union.
   B to be out of sync with its former goal of promoting liberal values.
   C to have been the spearhead of the campaign against liberal values.

4. By calling America an unhappy Atlas, the author refers to
   A Greek mythology.
   B the territory disputes between some South American states.
   C the project of the Panama Canal construction abandoned by the French and completed by the US.

5. Donald Trump’s stance on the role of the US in the geopolitics
   A is echoed by Russians and the Chinese.
   B is increasingly supported by his fellow citizens.
   C is embraced mostly by the representatives of the younger generation.

6. The success of the campaign against climate change is going to be compromised
   A by certain global powers.
   B by the next president of the United States.
   C by the countries remaining in the European Union.

7. The author of the essay considers the role of technology in politics
   A entirely positive.
   B vastly overrated.
   C detrimental to liberal values.

8. Liberals have been wrong in their estimation of
   A the investment into space technology.
   B the profit high-tech companies make in China.
   C the long-term effects of the technological progress in autocratic regimes.
9. The author of the essay believes that
   A China will follow double standards in its decision-making.
   B the United States will be outstripped by China in its military might.
   C the United States will collaborate with emerging economies to offset the upset in the balance of power.

10. The forecast about the future of the geopolitics given by the author of the essay can be characterised as
    A optimistic and upbeat.
    B tentative and cautious.
    C pessimistic and desperate.